

The Religious Origins of the Welfare State: Evidence from 19th Century Italy

PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN

Very preliminary

Caterina Chiopris* and Francesca Miserocchi*

January 2023

Abstract

How did the modern welfare state originate, and how did its origin affect its long-term development and efficiency? The literature has mostly pointed to the strength of the labor movement or social cleavages as determinants of welfare provision. Within the Italian post-unitary context, we take a different approach by highlighting that, in its early stages, welfare was not created anew by the state, but had instead been provided for centuries – by institutions affiliated with the Catholic Church. We plan to study the effect of the incorporation of these institutions into the state apparatus in 1890. We thus link historical welfare provision to the quality of welfare once it was under state control, by focusing on charities that were previously run by the clergy and that had to switch to private or public administration. We expect the effect of the change in administration to be positive in the regions where state institutions originated, and negative in the regions where state institutions were exported and ineffective at the local level. Using detailed historical records of Church-affiliated charities, their services and budgets, we plan to use a difference-in-differences strategy to study the effect of state incorporation on welfare provision, health and literacy outcomes, institutional resource management and administrative change.

1 Introduction

A major question within the literature on the political economy of advanced democracies relates to the origins of the welfare state – what drove its development, and how does it in turn affect the type of welfare provided? While the literature has mostly focused on

*Ph.D. Students, Political Economy and Government, Harvard University.

the expansion of the welfare state in the West in the 20th century, this project looks at its earlier stage, the end of the 19th century, specifically within the Italian context.

We begin our argument by noting that in this setting the state did not create new services, but rather incorporated institutions that had been providing welfare services for centuries, i.e., charitable religious institutions. We then argue that the quality of the existing institutions, and the extent to which the state was able to incorporate them effectively into its apparatus, are a major determinant of the success of welfare provided by the state. Traditionally, the literature has underlined the role of social cleavages, the strength of labor unions, and the Communist threat in explaining welfare state expansion. We acknowledge that these elements provided incentives for new welfare provision, especially in later periods. However, we also note that, in the early stages of public welfare, the state had another incentive for controlling welfare services: reducing the influence of the Catholic Church on society. Furthermore, our main focus lies in explaining institutional history - what was the institutional backbone on which the welfare state later developed?

We look at a reform of the Kingdom of Italy in 1890 that put Church-affiliated charities under the control of the state, and plan to study its effect on welfare service provision. Our predictions differ for the Northern and Southern regions of Italy. In the North, of which the national state institutions were endemic, we expect the state to successfully incorporate institutions affiliated with the Church, and welfare service provision to be relatively efficient. In the South, for which national state institutions were foreign, we expect the incorporated institutions to run relatively less efficiently. If we are correct in our prediction, we plan to explore the channels that can lead to different levels of institutional quality. Our current hypothesis points to mechanisms such as the lack of incentives for efficiency and the lack of information of non-local public officials, especially compared to local clergymen.

To test our theory, we have collected historical data on charitable institutions from two Italian regions: Piedmont, whose institutions were expanded into the rest of the peninsula,

and Sicily, which is considered the paradigm of a weak state in this time period. Our empirical strategy relies on a differences-in-differences design that compares municipalities with more Church-run charities (that were more exposed to the reform) and municipalities with relatively more state or private charities. Our preliminary analyses suggest that these two groups were comparable, and that the reform did have an effect on the administration and goals of the charities in line with the legislation, which was aimed at removing the clergy from the charities' boards and reduce the expenses on worship in favor of spending on welfare. Now that we have established that the reform did have an effect within the charities, we plan to check the effect of these changes on real outcomes measured at the municipality level. Specifically, we are in the process of digitizing health-related outcomes (especially outbreaks of serious infectious diseases) and educational outcomes (especially literacy rates). Next, if our hypothesis holds, we plan to study the mechanisms behind the different effects of the reform between Piedmont and Sicily – specifically what was behind the ‘weak state’ in Sicily that allowed charities’ funds to be misappropriated as the historical literature suggests.

We see this paper as a contribution to various strands of literature. It speaks to work on the origins of the welfare state in advanced democracies, and within it, we are not the first to link the Church, religion, and the welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1990), for instance, in his three type categorization, places Italy in the conservative welfare state category, and the Church enters his argument by providing the willingness to maintain traditional values. Lipset and Rokkan (1990) recognize that in this time period the Church-state conflict was a key factor. The relation of this conflict to the welfare state is indirect, as it provides the social cleavages on which parties then developed. Manow (2009) links these social cleavages with the electoral system to predict the type of welfare state, following Esping-Andersen's categories. In the Italian context, Lynch (2009) stresses the role of Christian Democracy as defining the development of the welfare state. Other recent contributions in this space include Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and the collection in Van Kersbergen and Manow (2009).

What distinguishes our argument is that in these accounts the Church affects the welfare state either through values or by determining social cleavages that are in turn reflected in parties. By focusing on the historical institutions affiliated with the Church, we hence point to a different, direct channel of influence on the later development of the welfare state, i.e., the institutional legacy.

In this sense, our argument is related to Grzymala-Busse (2020). However, she stresses how states emulated Church institutions in the medieval period, while we describe a different process: the extent to which the state was able to *incorporate* them. To the best of our knowledge, non-state welfare institutions have been studied in other contexts (Cammett and MacLean, 2011, for instance), but they have mostly been neglected in the European historical context, with the exception of the qualitative account of Kahl (2005). Similar to Heldring et al. (2021), we study the effects of a loss of power of the Church: while their outcome of interest is long-term economic growth, we are instead interested in institutional development. Unlike other contributions on the effect of secularization on the state and market institutions (Cantoni et al., 2018; Becker and Woessmann, 2009), we look at a Catholic rather than a Protestant setting.

More broadly, we contribute to the vast literature on the economic consequences of weak state institutions, such as Acemoglu et al. (2020), Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), Dell (2010), and Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). More specifically, we look at differences between the North and the South of Italy, on which much has been written – most notably Putnam et al. (1994), and more recently Grompone and Sessa (2014) and Federico et al. (2019). Similar to Lecce et al. (2021), we study the relationship between Piedmontese and Southern society, and expanding on Ziblatt (2008), we look at differences in state capacity across space around the Italian unification.

Last, our argument has implications for the origins of the mafia. Seminal work in this

space includes Gambetta (1996) and Lupo (2004); recent literature in economic history has identified several potential reasons for the rise and expansion of the mafia at the end of the 19th century, such as land protection (Bandiera, 2003), shocks in the price of sulphur or citrus (Buonanno et al., 2015; Dimico et al., 2017) and most recently the rise of the peasant *Fasci* (Acemoglu et al., 2020). We underline instead the potential for misappropriation of vast resources due to inefficient supervision of local governments.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the historical background of Italy in the 19th century, Church-state relations, and the state of welfare provision. We then describe our data and provide some descriptive statistics of the charities in our sample. Last, we provide preliminary results on the effect of the reform and we describe the next steps to establish an effect on real outcomes.

2 Historical Background

Italy in the 19th century. The reform of the charities that will be the main focus of the paper occurred in the peculiar background of a state that had just been unified, with its nation still having to be built.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Italian peninsula was split between several states: the Kingdom of Savoy in the North-West; Lombardy-Venetia in the North-East, under Austrian rule; the smaller states of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena and the Papal States in the center, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in the South, under the Bourbon dynasty. In 1860, the Kingdom of Savoy (based in today’s Piedmont) military annexed most of the central and Southern regions. In 1870 the unification process was mostly complete, with the new Kingdom of Italy conquering the remaining territories of the Papal States, including Rome. Figure 1 depicts the key stages of this process.

A key issue of the post-unification period was the decision over centralizing institutions. The major debate between a federalist and a centralized state was decided with the




Figure 1: The gradual expansion of the Kingdom of Savoy into the rest of Italy.

second option, over fears of separatist movements in the South. This meant in practice that Piedmontese institutions were exported to the centre and South of Italy: all national, regional and most provincial public officials were appointment by Piedmont, and many of them were Piedmontese individuals. The constitution, codes and regulations, and tax system were those of the old Kingdom of Savoy, which were simply expanded into the rest of the peninsula. Especially in the South, where the previous state had generally weak state presence, this process has largely been considered unsuccessful, as the new Kingdom’s institutions did not fit local conditions, lacked legitimacy, and could not penetrate local power dynamics. The liberal and anti-clerical nature of Piedmontese institutions clashed with the protectionist, rural and pro-clerical South. Note that a contribution of this project is to show a concrete example of this phenomenon: how the same institutions, if transplanted into ‘foreign’ territory, can lead to very different outcomes compared to the place where they originated.

The first decades of the newborn state were marked by widespread resentment in Southern regions towards the North, with a guerrilla-like phenomenon of *brigandage* leading to frequent violent uprisings against the unitary government (Lecce et al., 2021). In the island of Sicily, one of the two case studies of this paper, feudalistic institutions had just been

abolished in 1812, and only with partial success. Its rural economy was organized around a structure of large estates in the hands of few aristocrats. Post-unification resentment in the island came also from the failure of the state to redistribute land as promised by the Northerners before unification. In fact, famous mediators of redistribution of land towards farmers and small landholders were not state officials, but some of the early *mafiosi* (Lupo, 2004).

Church and state relations after Unification. The second important element of the time period was the continuous conflict between the state and the Catholic Church. Not surprisingly after the annexation of the Papal States into the Kingdom of Italy, the Church strenuously opposed the new state, for instance forbidding Catholics from participating into the Kingdom's political life. State-Church relations became more tense as in 1866 the state passed a law suppressing many religious orders, confiscating their belongings, in part assigning them to municipal governments. Expropriation of landholdings owned by the Church and sales through auctions to privates began in 1867, and lasted until the early 1900s. The goal of the expropriations by the liberal, anti-clerical state, was on the one hand to reduce the Church's influence, on the other to finance the war with Austria and annex the North-East of the peninsula. This attack on the Church created further resentment toward Northern institutions especially in the pro-clerical Southern society. In a petition signed by the citizens of the Sicilian town of Piazza Armerina against the suppression of religious orders, we read:

Do you believe that by giving to municipalities that part of wealth which currently is especially targeted for care of the sick, or public elementary or secondary schooling, you would be in the right? Never, because it is worth repeating: *all the possessions of religious orders are the wealth of the poor, of welfare and of education*; because for these goals only, when society could not offer other means, monasteries and convents were founded, and if they were put under the patronage of the Church, it was because only the Church was able to guaran-

tee their survival. (*Petizione dei Cittadini di Piazza Armerina al Parlamento Nazionale*, 1866, emphasis added)

This extract sums a key point for our argument: that for those in favor of the Church, religious possessions were serving the poor, and expropriating the Church and its charities was equivalent to removing welfare for the disadvantaged.

Welfare and charities at the time of unification. This brings us to the next point, the historical provision of welfare in Italy. Since the medieval era, the bulk of social, welfare and health services across the Italian states had been provided by religious institutions. In the 19th century, right before the initial stage of development of the welfare state, that was still the case: charities (*Opere Pie*) were the main institutions responsible for education, orphanages, hospitals, poor relief, alms, dowries, and to some extent giving work to the unemployed. Historically, only a minority thereof was administered by local governments; most of the charities were either directly managed by the Catholic Church, or by congregations affiliated with the Church. Their funding came chiefly from private donors, urban and rural assets, and bonds, and in some cases they had been accumulated for centuries through private donations (Farrell-Vinay, 1992).

As Italy was still divided into several states, every territory followed the same rough pattern of independent, atomic charities with religious affiliation but without an overarching supervision. In 1861, right after unification, around half of the charities was directly controlled by the Church or by affiliated associations (which we define “Church-run charities”), around 30% were run by municipal councilors, or their appointees (which we define as “State-run”); and around 20% of them were run by trustees in charge of managing bequests (which we define as “private”).

The new government of the Kingdom of Italy soon realized the financial importance of these institutions. In a census of charities of 1861, throughout the country there were 20,123

charities, with total assets of 1,191 million Lire, corresponding to more than twice the state revenues and half of public debt. Their revenues amounted to 84 million Lire, the equivalent of 2/3 of revenues from property tax on landholdings and buildings in the country, and their expenses to 85 million Lire, 54% of which going to poor assistance and 12% to stipends of employees. Our two regions of interest, Sicily and Piedmont, had respectively 2985 charities, with total assets 89 million Lire and revenues of 5 million Lire; and 1771 charities, with total assets 149 million and revenues amounting to 11 million Barone (1990).

Given this wealth, new legislation trying to bring the charities' financial resources and administration under state supervision began in the early 1860s. This initial legislation, rather than aiming at improving poor relief, was mostly another attempt at reducing the influence of the Church among the masses, especially in the South. The initial reforms tried to rationalize and bring the charities under local governments' control by creating Congregations, overarching bodies with supervisory functions, but were largely ineffective (Farrell-Vinay, 1992; Barbetta et al., 1993).

The 1890 reform. The new legislation of 1890 (*legge Crispi*) was the first serious attempt at regulating the *Opere Pie*, and is the main focus of this project. It was prompted by investigations denouncing the charities' inefficient use of resources, the lack of state supervision, and their proneness to corruption (Inchiesta Correnti, 1875-1876). The reform was aimed at creating a state-controlled social services system, by incorporating the existing charities into the state apparatus and turning them into public institutions. It introduced the principle of public accountability of the charities, and set rules on who could sit on their administrative boards, excluding a large portion of the clergy. Charities had to release statutes, to be approved by the Interior Ministry, while their budgets and accounts were to be supervised by a provincial council. The reform also aimed at rationalizing resources through mergers of existing charities and congregations, and sharing the lists of beneficiaries across institutions. All charities were put under the direct control of municipalities, by establishing that each municipality should have a congregation of charity, whose members

were elected by municipal councils, and from which priests were excluded. Charities with no public utility, meaning those with unnecessary devotional purposes, should be transformed into welfare institutions. Note that within this institutional setting, local governments were responsible for avoiding collusion, misappropriation of resources, clientelism and use of the charities for political patronage (Farrell-Vinay, 1992).

Case studies, the mafia and charities. We do see examples in which the goal and administration of charities did in fact change after the reform. For instance, the Collegio di Maria al Capo, founded in 1729 by a priest, was initially administrated by the clergy exclusively (a mother superior), providing schooling to 226 girls. In 1905, after the reform, it was administered by the mother superior and a member elected by municipality.

The hospital of San Rocco, on the other hand, was devoted to healthcare and worship in 1861, and was administered by the clergy within a confraternity. In 1905, its stated goal was changed to healthcare exclusively and administered by the congregation of charity, putting it under the control of the municipal government.

Less successful cases reported by the secondary literature describe the mafia's infiltration into the charities' administration and its control over assets. Barone (1990) reports: "In the soft womb of a charity as important as the bequest of the Prince of Palagonia, the mafia was able to stretch its tentacles undisturbed, up to the point of precociously unifying organized crime on the Palermo-Catania axis."

The charity Principe di Palagonia was founded through an inheritance originally destined to dowries for poor women. Bartolomeo Badalamenti – forefather of one of the most important families of the 1900 sicilian mafia – was the trustee of the charity in 1886. The charity became infamous due to the complaints of the administrators of the Palermo civic hospital, which reported its corruption and clientelism. The funds originally destined to dowries decreased, accompanied by an unjustified increase of administration expenses reach-

ing 37% of revenues. At the same time, it is reported that members of the mafia had the power of appointing people in the administration of the charity. Eventually, in 1907 the charity and its assets were incorporated by the Palermo civic hospital, and the *mafioso* Badalamenti was excluded from the administration. Nonetheless, he managed to make his fortune from the charities' assets, despite coming from a modest background: as the hospital's lands were sold, he secured such low prices for himself as to become a major landowner. The mafia's infiltration does not seem to have been an issue of the Palagonia charity alone. In 1916, the priest Giorgio Gennaro was murdered, guilty of having denounced during Sunday mass the mafia's appropriation of Church rents and assets (Lupo, 2004, p. 187).

3 Theoretical Contribution

The goal of the paper is to study the substitution of Church and state provided welfare at the incipit of the welfare state. Once Church welfare institutions were incorporated into the state, did the provision of welfare improve? The answer to this question may not be obvious. In general terms, the state might have had better coordination capacity across institutions, making welfare provision more effective, for instance by preventing the same group of people from receiving welfare from multiple institutions, and by ensuring a larger segment of the population to be covered. Despite the Catholic Church's hierarchical structure, outside of the old Papal States there did not seem to be an effort to coordinate activities across charities, both across and within municipalities.

At the same time, while it might have lacked coordination and supervision capacity, the Church could rely on a legacy of welfare provision inherited from a centuries-long tradition, on top of the resources provided by the faithful.

We argue that the success of the incorporation may depend on relative state capacity, and how both the Church and local governments interacted with society. We expect the effect of the reform incorporating charities into the state apparatus to be different between the North (especially in the region of Piedmont) and the South (where we focus on the region of Sicily).

In the region of Piedmont, state institutions were endemic and already established. Once the supervision of welfare provision was shifted to local governments, the latter already had a relatively well-functioning structure in place. This meant that local governments had (1) the human capital, or qualified personnel, to be able to supervise and administer the charities; (2) the informational capacity to know which areas and individuals were receiving welfare, and which ones did not; and (3) the support of the population (and local elites especially), joint with a general anti-clerical sentiment, which facilitated compliance with rules.

The case of Sicily is more complex. State institutions were exported, and top bureaucrats at the regional and provincial level were often not from Sicily.¹ This may be important for the supervision aspect of the reform. Since provincial governments were in charge of coordinating and supervising the aggregation of charities, if provincial officials were not embedded in the network of local officials and local elites at the municipality level, they would be lacking the information necessary for efficient aggregation of charities. This would be especially true in the Sicilian context, where a weak bureaucracy would make the gathering and transmission of information more problematic. Furthermore, the legacy of a weak state apparatus from the previous Bourbonic state could have led to a lack of qualified personnel to be employed in the public sector. Last, the resentment towards Northern institutions would lead the population – and local elites – to be less cooperative with state institutions. This could be interpreted as a lack of ‘civic virtue’, or as a failure of the Piedmontese in establishing trust among the Southern population. In practice, it would mean that cases of misappropriation of resources and lack of compliance with rules would go unreported and unpunished. It would then not be surprising that the mafia, which expanded in Sicily in the first decades after unification, had the room to maneuver its way into the charities’

¹For instance, for only two years in the 60-year period between 1861 and 1920 had Palermo an appointed provincial prefect who was actually from Sicily – the rest of the prefects were from other Italian regions, the modal prefect coming from Piedmont.

resources. Once funds were taken away from the Church's supervision, and local government officials were not properly controlling their usage, the power vacuum left inside the institutions could be easily exploited and misuse of funds go unregistered.

In sum, we expect the takeover by the state of welfare institutions to lead to better outcomes in Piedmont than in Sicily. In practice, we expect either outcomes to improve in Piedmont, and not to in Sicily; or to stay roughly constant in Piedmont, and worsen in Sicily – we are thus far agnostic on the exact magnitude of the effect.

Our theory should be considered work in progress. In the future, we need to specify the distinction between the incentives to provide welfare of the Church and the state respectively, and the difference between North and South. Specifically, a few issues may matter for the two institutions' objectives.

First, the interests of the local elites: in this time period, assistance to the poor seemed to have been mostly motivated by the desire to prevent social unrest, and the desire to hide the poor from the sight of the wealthier classes. It is likely that both the state and the Church had an interest in doing so in order to gain the favor of local elites – either to gain their electoral support or to maintain their donations. We expect this factor to be the same between Piedmont and Sicily.

Second, the Church might have had an additional incentive in caring for the poor, i.e., to maintain or expand the mass of the faithful. Given the general pro- and anti-Church sentiment in the South and the North, one would assume this factor to be more relevant for the clergy in the South, a stronghold of the Catholic Church.

On the other hand, it is unclear to what extent local public officials took the interests of the poor into account, given that only the richest strata of the population were allowed to vote until 1912 (with proper male universal suffrage in 1918).

Third, the career incentives of both public officials and priests should be considered. It is not obvious whether the performance of welfare institutions mattered for a bureaucrat's or local elected official's career advancement, and it could have been different between Piedmont and Sicily. The performance of public officials in Piedmont could have been easier to observe by those in higher-ranked positions and hence facilitate one's career advancement. An official's performance in Sicily would have been harder to observe and hence less relevant for career prospects.

As for the clergy, the performance of welfare provision might have mattered to gain a reputation and advance in the Catholic Church's hierarchy.

Last, a further important difference for our hypothesis is the process of industrialization, which occurred earlier in Piedmont, while Sicily was still a mostly rural economy throughout our period of interest. The pressure of the urban working class would hence have been more salient in Piedmont; while Sicily's peasant *Fasci* movement of 1889-1994 was mostly supported by workers of mines and large estates, who were also linked by religious sentiments.

While we will study all these factors more carefully in future iterations, considering the state's and the Church's potential incentives to provide welfare confirms our hypothesis that public officials' incentives to improve the performance of charities would have been either the same or stronger in Piedmont. On the other hand, the clergy's incentives to do the same would have been the same or stronger in Sicily.

4 Data

To compare the effect of the incorporation of religious institutions into the state across Northern and Southern Italy, we focus our analysis on two regions: Piedmont, whose insti-

tutions were exported to the rest of Italy after unification, and Sicily, a Southern region in which the Church had arguably a predominant influence.

Our main data of interest relate to the charities in these two regions, which we collected from a survey of the *Opere Pie* conducted by the Kingdom of Italy's statistical institute. For the period between the Unification and the 1890 reform, complete surveys of all charities in Italy exist for the year 1861 and 1880, which we have collected and digitized from *Le Opere pie nel 1861, a cura della Direzione generale della statistica* and *Statistica delle opere pie al 31 dicembre 1880, Spese di beneficenza sostenute dai comuni e dalle provincie*. After the reform, the first complete survey of charities was compiled 1900-1903, available in the Italian State Central Archives, section of the Ministry of the Interior, under *Condizioni patrimoniali e finanziarie delle istituzioni pubbliche di beneficenza*, reported in 1905. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to collect and use this data for quantitative analysis.

The surveys for the three years we currently have digitized (1861, 1880, 1905) follow roughly the same structure; they include the name, municipality, goal, administration, and foundation date of all charities existing in 1861 and 1880 respectively, as well as their budgets, expenditures, and some indication of the service provided (e.g. number of hospital beds). A sample page can be found in Figure A.9 in the appendix.

We have also digitized sales data for Piedmont and Sicily of the auction of all Church land properties that were expropriated starting from 1866, collected in the Italian State Central Archives under the *Asse Ecclesiastico, Beni Posti in Vendita*. The data contains detailed records of the previous Church institution owning the land, the buyer, auction prices, the size and the description of the land. A sample page can be found in Figure A.10. At a later stage in the project, we plan to use these data to measure the shock to Church assets.

We are in the process of digitizing health-related outcomes, coming from archival records

of the Ministry of Health. Specifically, we have detailed counts of cases by municipality of epidemiological shocks: smallpox (1901), diphtheria (1901), cholera (1911), while malaria cases in 1885 are from Acemoglu et al. (2020).

Further data that could prove useful for this project include census data for roughly every ten years starting in 1861, a pre-period cadastral census for Sicily (1853), and agricultural survey data collected between 1877 and 1886. Acemoglu et al. (2020) provide additional data at the municipal level for Sicily, such as the presence of peasants fasci, access to postal roads, mafia presence in 1885 and in 1900, as well as various controls that have been identified by previous work as explanatory variables for the rise of the mafia in Sicily (such as citrus cultivation and sulphur mines). We reconstructed the historical municipality boundaries from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).

5 Preliminary Analysis


At this stage, we only have complete data for Sicily, so we will focus most of the analysis on this region only, with the goal of expanding it to Piedmont.

As a first step, we ran preliminary analyses in order to understand (1) the relative location and distribution of charities throughout the Sicilian territory, (2) the goals and types of administration of the institutions, and (3) whether the reform had the expected effect on changes of administration. We explore each point in the following subsections.


5.1 Location and Description of Charities

Since the presence of the Church was not randomly assigned, it is fundamental for our analysis to understand where the charities were located. Figure 2 shows the concentration of the number of charities in Piedmont and Sicily.

For Sicily, we are able to run a balance test of the characteristics of municipalities with



(a) Piedmont



(b) Sicily

Figure 2: Number of charities by municipality in Piedmont and Sicily in 1861.




Figure 3: Correlation between number of charities and municipalities' characteristics for Sicily in 1861, with 95% confidence intervals.

a higher and lower number of charities in our starting period, 1861. Figure 3 shows that more populous municipalities tended to have more charities, as expected; and agro-towns tend also to have more charities. Agro-towns are rural centers where landless farmers concentrated in order to get work in large estates (Acemoglu et al., 2020), a by-product of the Sicilian concentrated landholding structure. Charities also seem to have been more common in richer towns (higher urban rent). Summing up, as we would expect and in line with Barone (1990), charities' concentration tends to follow the concentration of (wealthier) people.

While this trend is useful for our general understanding of charities, it does not directly represent a threat to our analysis. The latter in fact will not be comparing municipalities with and without charities; instead, it will be comparing municipalities with more or less charities initially administered by the Church. Hence the key issue for our analysis is to establish whether charities that were run or influenced by the Church were located in places




Figure 4: Correlation between number of charities run by the Church and municipalities' characteristics for Sicily in 1861, with 95% confidence intervals.

that were significantly different from the other charities that were run by the state or by privates. Figure 4 shows the results of a balance test between Church and non-Church charities. Overall, it does not look like Church charities were located in significantly different places compared to state and private ones, with the exception of agro-towns. Figure A.7 in the Appendix shows their geographical distribution.

As our identification strategy will rely on a difference-in-differences design, we interpret the latter balance test as not substantially threatening the parallel trends assumption *ex ante*, where the comparison is between municipalities with more or less Church charities, conditional on total number of charities.

Looking within the institutions, Figure A.8 in the Appendix shows the composition of charities before the reform. The major change occurring between 1861 and 1880 on the administration side is the expansion of Congregation of Charities, which indicates an institution coordinating several institutions. As for the goals the charities had in their statutes,

more charities seem to be dedicated to schooling (which had by then become compulsory across Italy), and relatively less to worship.

However, looking at the sheer number of charities does not reveal their relative weight within communities. For instance, charities related to health (mostly hospitals) were likely less in number but needed larger endowments, and were more likely to play an important role within a municipality. To measure the relative importance of charities, we look instead at their expenses in a given year. We divide expenses, following the balance sheets, between poor assistance – anything that today would correspond to welfare – and worship. Expenses for poor assistance include direct poor relief (transfers to the poor), the establishment of work houses, dowries for young women without means, orphanages, schooling for the poor and for the general population, support to the incarcerated, and so forth. Expenses for worship include celebration of mass, donations to Churches, financial support to confraternities, celebration of saints, etc. While in this time period both worship and poor relief institutions were considered *Opere Pie*, our main interest lies in those charities providing welfare services; and one of the goals of the 1890 reform was to diminish expenses for worship in favor of poor relief.

Figure 5 provides a breakdown of expenses by charities divided first by the goal of their statutes (top) and second by administration (Church versus non-Church, at the bottom). One should note that even if a charity had a specific goal (e.g. poor relief), it was not infrequent for it to also have expenditures for worship, and vice versa. Looking at the top of the figure, as we would expect, institutions dedicated to health and schooling, even if smaller in number, had generally higher expenses compared to worship institutions and institutions that provided other types of poor assistance. We also see a general decreasing trend for expenditures on worship, even among institutions chiefly dedicated to worship. Institutions providing other types of poor assistance only contributed to a small fraction of total expenses.


The bottom of the same figure shows, again not surprisingly, a decrease in expenses of charities administered by the Church in 1905, and an increase for charities administered by local government representatives and by private individuals – another sign of the implementation of the reform, in line with charities switching from Church to non-Church administration.

5.2 Change in administration after the reform


We next want to establish whether the reform succeeded in achieving one of its goals, i.e., removing the clergy from the charities’ administration. We know from the secondary literature that this was a slow and bumpy process (Farrell-Vinay, 1992; Barbetta et al., 1993). Establishing this result is an important intermediary step for our analysis: if we want to compare outcomes between state and Church-run institutions, we should first of all see that Church institutions did in fact change their administration after the reform. The top of Figure 6 plots the total number of charities in Sicily across our three years dividing them by type of administration: either Church-run or run by representatives of local governments, or as congregation of charities. We see a general decline in the number of Church charities, which becomes steeper after the reform, with an increase in state charities and Congregations afterwards – as we would expect.

The bottom of the same figure shows the change in administration for the charities that were run by the Church in 1880. While most of them were already Church-run in 1861, more than half switched to a non-Church administration in 1905.

We interpret these results as an indication that, while the reform might not have been carried out fully by 1905, by the first post-period we observe there had been significant changes in the administration of our treated charities, those who had the clergy either appointing members of administrative councils or administering the charity directly. We corroborate these results in the next section.



(a) Expenses by goal of the charity.



(b) Expenses by the type of administration.

Figure 5: Total expenses of charities with different goals (top) and different administration (Church vs. non-Church) in Sicily in 1861, 1880, 1905.




Figure 6: Changes in administration of charities. The plot above depicts the number of charities administered by the Church, and by the state or as a congregation. The plot below shows, for the charities that in 1880 were run by the Church, their administration in 1861 and 1905.

6 Empirical Strategy

6.1 Institutional Level: Changes in administration

We ran further preliminary analyses among the sub-sample of charities that we observe and matched across the three years, which includes 896 institutions. To expand on the results from Figure 6, we compare charities that were Church-administered and those that were not, and compare them before and after the reform, following our baseline specification for analyses at the level of the charity:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D_i + \beta_2 \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 D_i \cdot \text{Post}_t + v_{it} \quad (1)$$

where D_i is a dummy equalling to 1 if the charity was administered by the church in 1861 (prior to reform), Post indicates the period after the reform (1905), and Y_{it} the outcome of interest, measured for institution i in year t .

Table 1 reports the results of our current analysis for the change in charities' administration and stated goals. Column (1) shows the regression where the outcome is a dummy for whether the charity was administered by the Church or not. What we see is in line with our expectation: less charities were run by the clergy after 1890, and the decrease is especially strong for those originally run by the Church (i.e., the charities that would have needed to switch administration). Columns (2)-(5) use as outcomes dummies for the stated goals of the charities. In the baseline, Church charities were less likely to be dedicated to health, schooling, and poor assistance, and more likely to be active in worship. After the reform, all charities overall were less likely to be dedicated to worship, and more likely to have poor assistance as their stated goal. Compared to the general trend for charities, those that were originally administered by the Church saw a smaller decrease in the likelihood of being active in worship, and a smaller increase in the likelihood of being active in poor assistance.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Church Admin.	Goal:Health	Goal:worship	Goal:schooling	Goal:poor assistance
D(Church)	0.883*** (0.0123)	-0.102*** (0.0123)	0.318*** (0.0230)	-0.166*** (0.0213)	-0.0224** (0.0104)
Post	-0.0542*** (0.0140)	0.0103 (0.0207)	-0.148*** (0.0330)	0.00307 (0.0327)	0.131*** (0.0243)
D(Church)#Post	-0.685*** (0.0254)	0.0401 (0.0245)	0.0729* (0.0432)	0.00807 (0.0400)	-0.0952*** (0.0280)
N charities	896	896	896	896	896
Observations	2,287	2,302	2,302	2,302	2,302
R-squared	0.742	0.054	0.138	0.044	0.070

Table 1: 1890 reform, charity management and charity goals.

Table 2 shows instead the results for the expenses of charities, and we see similar patterns. In general, Church charities spent less, especially for poor assistance, and more for worship, controlling for total expenses. After the reform, charities did not see a significant change in overall expenditures; however, they did tend to spend more on poor assistance and less on worship, as foreseen by the reform. The charities that were run by the clergy in 1861 saw a smaller increase (in fact, a decrease) in expenses for the poor, and a smaller decrease in expenses toward worship.

These results provide evidence in support of an effect of the reform on the charities' administration: charities originally run by the clergy did in fact switch to a public or private administration, and there was less spent on worship compared to general welfare.

Please note: all the above results should be considered preliminary, as our categorization of "Church", "state" and "private" charities was tentative, and will be defined more precisely in the future.

	(6)	(7)	(9)
	log(tot. expenses)	log(expenses for poor assistance)	log(expenses for worship)
D(Church)	-0.361*** (0.0812)	-0.316*** (0.0800)	0.498*** (0.0551)
Post	-0.0834 (0.121)	0.151** (0.0677)	-0.599*** (0.113)
D(Church)#Post	0.128 (0.151)	-0.207* (0.114)	0.302** (0.127)
log(tot. expenses)		0.985*** (0.0147)	0.686*** (0.0171)
N charities	896	896	896
Observations	2,332	1,274	1,554
R-squared	0.028	0.771	0.586

Table 2: 1890 reform, charity management.

6.2 Municipality Level: Real Outcomes

Once we have established an effect of the reform at the institutional level, our main interest lies in establishing a tangible effect occurring within municipalities. Our baseline specification for the regressions at the municipality level will be:

$$Y_{mt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Church_m + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 Church_m \cdot Post_t + \beta_4 X_{mt} + v_{it} \quad (2)$$

where $Church_m$ is number of charities administered by the Church in 1861 prior to the reform, which indicates higher exposure to state incorporation. X_{mt} is a set of controls including the total number of charities, population of municipality, and additional geographical controls such as a dummy for agro-town, determinants of the mafia, altitude, and so forth.

Y_{mt} will be the real outcome of interest. We are considering and digitizing the following outcomes. First, infant mortality, or mortality rates. Given that charities were the main (only) provider of hospitals and health services, we should expect an effect of the reform on

health-related outcomes if the change in administration affected the efficiency with which such services were provided. Infant and general mortality are the obvious outcomes that come to mind as an indicator of status of health. However, we are concerned that changes in these two outcomes are more reflective of general patterns of improvement of hygienic standards or economic growth, on which changes in administration of a single hospital might not have a tangible impact.

Second, we are considering the number of cases of severe infectious diseases, and/or number of deaths, for the years in which there were epidemics, and hence official statistics were compiled. In the pre-period, we have data for cases of malaria in 1885, from Acemoglu et al. (2020). We are also digitizing cases for the post-period of smallpox (1901), diphtheria (1901), and cholera (1911). We expect that in these relatively short-term crises the effect of efficient single institutions might be more impactful than on mortality rates. However, the number of cases and deaths for such diseases might be determined by idiosyncratic factors, which would also be outside the control of health institutions.

Last, we plan to look at literacy rates, or alternatively enrollment in secondary education. While elementary education had become compulsory in Italy right after unification, a good portion of the population was still illiterate. At the same time, charities and the Church had historically been the main provider of education, and schooling was one of the main goals among charities. We would hence expect a change in the efficiency of the institutions to have an effect on educational outcomes.

6.2.1 Charities and the Mafia

An additional contribution of the paper relates to the history of the rise of the mafia. As reported above, historians provide case studies of institutions that the mafia was able to infiltrate and to abuse the massive resources of, thanks to the power vacuum created by the change in administration. We study whether this was the case in general and detectable in the aggregate.

As a preliminary analysis, Table 3 shows correlates of mafia presence, total number of

charities, and number of original Church charities in a certain municipality across the years. We see that before the reform, the mafia was not more present in municipalities with more charities, either in total number or Church-run charities. Things change after the reform: the mafia seem to expand not necessarily in municipalities with more charities in general, but in municipalities that before the reform had more Church charities, and were hence more exposed to the reform and the potential power-vacuum following it. The correlation is visible 10 years after the reform, and seems to persist until the 1980s. The correlate is significant even after including other determinants of the mafia as found in previous literature, and a dummy for agro-towns, which was one potential difference in location between Church and non-Church charities.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mafia1885	Mafia1900	Mafia1987	Mafia1987
Church Charities, 1861	0.0123 (0.0101)	0.0291** (0.0130)	0.0103** (0.00451)	0.0111** (0.00490)
N. Charities, 1861	-0.00108 (0.00743)	-0.0148 (0.00971)	-0.00409 (0.00330)	-0.00439 (0.00338)
Controls 1	yes	yes	yes	yes
Controls 2	no	no	no	yes
District FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Observations	307	261	307	307
R-squared	0.249	0.563	0.471	0.489

Controls 1 include district fixed effects and 1861 log population.

Controls 2 include the intensity of the peasant fasci movement, agro-towns, urban rents, rural rents.

Table 3: Mafia presence and number of total and Church charities between 1885 and 1987.

7 Conclusion

Within the literature on the origins of the welfare state in advanced democracies, an often neglected aspect is the legacy of religious institutions that had historically provided welfare-like services, especially in the form of poor assistance, health services, and education. We stress that studying the incorporation of these institutions into the liberal state apparatus can be considered the origin of the welfare state, and is an important factor for its later performance and development.

We focus on the context of Italy after its unification in the second half of the 19th century, and study the effect of a 1890 reform that put Catholic welfare-providing institutions (charities) under the supervision of local governments. To this end, we have collected data on the charities' budgets, administration, and welfare expenditures before and after the reform. We expect the effect of the incorporation into the state to be different between places with strong and weak state capacity. While we have established that the reform did impact the institutions which should have been affected by the new regulation, future iterations of the paper will study (1) the effect on real outcomes such as health and education indicators, and (2) the exact mechanisms at work behind different effects of a strong versus a weak state.

References

- Acemoglu, Daron, Giuseppe De Feo, and Giacomo Davide De Luca. Weak states: Causes and consequences of the Sicilian mafia. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 87(2):537–581, 2020.
- Bandiera, Oriana. Land reform, the market for protection, and the origins of the Sicilian mafia: theory and evidence. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 19(1):218–244, 2003.
- Barbetta, Gian Paolo, Helmut K Anheier, Changsoon Hwang, and Lester M Salamon. *Defining the nonprofit sector: Italy*. 1993.
- Barone, Giuseppe. Lo stato e le opere pie in Sicilia. In *Chiesa e società urbana in Sicilia (1890-1920) : atti del convegno di studi, Catania, 18-20 maggio 1989*, Quaderni di Synaxis 6. Galatea, Acireale, 1990.
- Becker, Sascha O and Ludger Woessmann. Was Weber wrong? a human capital theory of protestant economic history. *The quarterly journal of economics*, 124(2):531–596, 2009.
- Buonanno, Paolo, Ruben Durante, Giovanni Prarolo, and Paolo Vanin. Poor institutions, rich mines: Resource curse in the origins of the sicilian mafia. *The Economic Journal*, 125(586):F175–F202, 2015.
- Cammett, Melani Claire and Lauren M MacLean. Introduction: the political consequences of non-state social welfare in the global south. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 46(1):1–21, 2011.
- Cantoni, Davide, Jeremiah Dittmar, and Noam Yuchtman. Religious competition and reallocation: The political economy of secularization in the protestant reformation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(4):2037–2096, 2018.
- Dell, Melissa. The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita. *Econometrica*, 78(6):1863–1903, 2010.

- Dimico, Arcangelo, Alessia Isopi, and Ola Olsson. Origins of the Sicilian mafia: The market for lemons. *The Journal of Economic History*, 77(4):1083–1115, 2017.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta. *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Farrell-Vinay, Giovanna. The old charities and the new state: structures and problems of welfare in Italy (1860-1890). 1992.
- Federico, Giovanni, Alessandro Nuvolari, and Michelangelo Vasta. The origins of the Italian regional divide: Evidence from real wages, 1861–1913. *The Journal of Economic History*, 79(1):63–98, 2019.
- Gambetta, Diego. *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Gennaioli, Nicola and Ilia Rainer. The modern impact of precolonial centralization in Africa. *Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(3):185–234, 2007.
- Grompone, Adele and Luca Sessa. Cultural persistence? evidence from an administrative reform on borders of southern Italy. *Bank of Italy*, 2014.
- Grzymala-Busse, Anna. Beyond war and contracts: The medieval and religious roots of the European state. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 23:19–36, 2020.
- Heldring, Leander, James A Robinson, and Sebastian Vollmer. The long-run impact of the dissolution of the English monasteries. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(4): 2093–2145, 2021.
- Kahl, Sigrun. The religious roots of modern poverty policy: Catholic, lutheran, and reformed protestant traditions compared. *Archives Européennes de Sociologie/European Journal of Sociology/Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, pages 91–126, 2005.
- Lecce, Giampaolo, Laura Ogliari, and Tommaso Orlando. Resistance to institutions and cultural distance: Brigandage in post-unification Italy. *Available at SSRN 3826144*, 2021.

- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments. In Mair, Peter, editor, *The west European party system*. Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Lupo, Salvatore. *Storia della mafia: dalle origini ai giorni nostri*. Donzelli editore, 2004.
- Lynch, Julia. Italy: a christian democratic or clientelist welfare state? In Van Kersbergen, Kees and Philip Manow, editors, *Religion, class coalitions, and welfare states*, pages 91–118. Cambridge University Press Cambridge, UK, 2009.
- Manow, Philip. Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain Esping-Andersen with Stein Rokkan. *Socio-Economic Review*, 7(1):101–121, 2009.
- Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou. Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development. *Econometrica*, 81(1):113–152, 2013.
- Poidomani, Giancarlo. *Le opere pie in Sicilia, 1861-1915: alle origini dello stato sociale*, volume 9. Bonanno, 2005.
- Putnam, Robert D, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y Nanetti. *Making democracy work*. Princeton university press, 1994.
- Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. Religion and preferences for social insurance. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(3):255–286, 2006.
- Van Kersbergen, Kees and Philip Manow. *Religion, class coalitions, and welfare states*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Ziblatt, Daniel. *Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of Federalism*. Princeton University Press, 2008.

A Appendix




Figure A.7: Number of Church charities by municipality in Sicily in 1861.




Figure A.8: Composition of charities in 1861 and 1880 in Sicily, by type of administration and goal. ‘Charity’ among the administration types indicates a congregation of charities (overseeing institution).

STATISTICA DELLE OPERE PIE																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																														
COMUNI	OPERE PIE			ANNO di istituzione o di cessazione	STATO PATRIMONIALE					ATO ATTIVO		STATO PASSIVO										BENEFICENZA																																																																																																																																																																																																																																								
	DENOMINAZIONE	AMMINISTRAZIONE	SCOPO		FONDI URBANI	FONDI RURALI	TITOLI di rendita del GranLibro (lateranea) ec.	CAPITALI ec.	ATTIVITÀ ATTIVA passiva	ATTIVITÀ passiva	SPESA ANNUA					ONERATI PATRIMONIALI		SPESA passiva	ANNEE MORALI		NUMERO del 1851	GIORNATE per anno nel 1861																																																																																																																																																																																																																																								
											REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.		REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.			REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.	REPORTI di esercizio ec.

Figure A.9: Sample Page of *Statistica delle Opere Pie* for Sicily, 1861. The columns describe, in order: the municipality, the name of the charity, the administration, the goal, year of establishment, active wealth (urban assets, rural assets, bonds, rents), expenditures (taxes, wages, welfare expenditures, worship expenditures) and a breakdown of welfare expenditures.

